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Gaius Volusenus Quadratus

The Commander of Caesar's Cavalry

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57BC - Campaigns against the Helvetii

Before Caesar left Gaul for Italy following his piecemeal conquest of the Belgic tribes at the end of the campaign season of 57BC, he sent his legate Servius Galba with Legio XII and a detachment of cavalry to winter in the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni. After a short but successful campaign against these tribes, during which several fortresses were taken, Galba recieved envoys, took hostages then looked to encamp his forces for the winter. Two cohorts of the twelfth were quartered in the territory of the Nantuates, probably at Acaunum on the Rhodanus, while the bulk of the legion was housed at Octodurus, a village of the Veragri which straddled the river further upstream.

The complement of the main camp was noticably under-strength, and this fact enticed the Veragri to go-back on their previous promises of peace and to strike back. Before the camp had been completed, the Veragri, aided by a large contingent of the Seduni swept down from the encircling mountains and surrounded the Roman position, hurling spears and sling-stones. Although Galba's cohorts gave as good as they received, after six hours of this mode of combat things were getting pretty desperate because, unlike the Gauls who could replace wounded or flagging warriors by fresh participants, the Romans were unable to rest, although they had recieved far fewer casualties by dint of their partially completed defences.

At this moment in history, we are presented with our first mention of Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, who was then serving as military tribune in - or attached to (see below) - the twelfth legion, and was numbered among those in the beleaguered fortress, for we are told;

"... The situation was as bad as it could be; and Baculus - the chief centurion who, as already said, was disabled by several wounds in the battle with the Nervii - came running to Galba with Gaius Volusenus Quadratus, a military tribune and a man of sound judgement and great courage, and told him that their only hope of escape was to try their last resource - a sortie through the enemies lines..."

We can glean much from this single sentence about the nature of the man; he seems to have been approachable and respected amongst the centurions in the legion, for of all the military tribunes present in the fortress, it was he who was petitioned by the centurions, the most experienced and war-hardened veterans in the legion, and he who accompanied the legions most accomplished centurion - the primus pilus or 'first spear' - Publius Sextius Baculus, in the deputation to Galba. There must have been at least five or six other military tribunes present at Octodurus, given that the normal complement of a legion was six tribunes and that at least one, possibly two were at this time commanding the two cohorts stationed in the territory of the Nantuates.

We must not forget that there was another tribune present in the person of the commander of the auxiliary cavalry regiment which had been stationed with the bulk of the legion at Octodurus. Volusenus may well have been this man, for in the hierarchy of the Roman military cursus, a military tribune in command of a cavalry unit ranked above legionary tribunes. This would explain why Volusenus was chosen from among the others, and is seemingly backed up by the fact that he was made commander of Caesar's cavalry in the later campaigns; it does not explain the use of the title of military tribune however, for the usual title of the commander of a cavalry unit was praefectus alae, or in modern day parlance 'wing commander'.

In this passage, Caesar describes Volusenus in very favourable terms, commending his judgmental skills and his couragous nature. Praise indeed for a man with Caesar's outstanding abilities and impeccably noble lineage to admit that he valued the opinions of this Military Tribune. If Caesars memoires of his Gallic Wars were ever displayed upon the public notice-boards in the forum in Rome, his mention of Volusenus' name would do his reputation nothing but good - at least in the eyes of the common people of Rome.

To continue with the narrative, we are told that after recieving the deputation of Volusenus and Baculus, Galba ordered his men to cease their offensive and to resort merely to parrying enemy missiles with their shields in order to regain their strength. Presently, the Romans rushed out from all four gates of the fortress - presumably two legionary cohorts and a contingent of cavalry from each gate - and took the surrounding enemy completely by surprise, killing a great many and forcing the rest to leave the vicinity in complete disarray. We are told that out of an army of thirty thousand Gaulish warriors over ten thousand were killed. The following morning, Galba destroyed his fortifications and retreated through the lands of the Nantuantes, presumably picking up the two legionary cohorts left there, back to the territories of the Allobroges in the Roman Gallic Province, where he spent the rest of the winter. The route which Galba's expedition was expected to open was through the Great Saint Bernard pass across the Alps from Genava in Gallia Narbonensis to Augusta Praetoria in Gallia Transpadana. The primary reason for his failure was the inadequate size of his force.

For the full account of the unsuccessful Alpine campaign of Galba in 57BC, see de Bello Gallico Book III chapters 1 thru 6.

55BC - Reconnoiters Britain Prior to Caesars Venture

After Caesar had returned from his first expedition across the Rhine which, so he tells us, he had performed to "overawe the Germans, punish the Sugambri [who had the audacity to order Caesar to stay on the western bank of the Rhine], and relieve the Ubii from the harrassing pressure of the Suebi." This was a very successful strategic move, which showed the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine that he was prepared to take the fight to them.

The Suebi (or Suevi) had abandoned thousands of square miles of land, dispersed their non-combatants into the surrounding forests, and assembled their entire fighting force at a single location deep inside their territory as soon as they heard that Caesar had bridged the Rhine. This is the story Caesar himself tells us, implying that the powerful Suebi were afraid of meeting him in battle. Their response, in my opinion, is the logical one - remove the women, children and the infirm to places of safety and concentrate their fighting forces.

The Rhine bridge - and the implied threat it's mere existence provided - was a powerful persuasive to the tribes close to the Rhine to remain in their own lands. This allowed Caesar to temporarily move the troublesome Germanic tribes to the back of his mind and to concentrate his energies to the west, and Britain. He wanted to send an expeditionary force comprising two legions plus cavalry support to Britain. In order to land a force of this size - around fifteen thousand men - he needed to identify a British seaport he could capture, or failing that, another suitable landing place along the British coast.

Caesar at first rounded-up all of the merchants in the Gaulish seaports and questioned any whom his informants said had connections with Britain, but his off-hand treatment of the merchants which plied their trade between mainland Gaul and the British tribes earned him no more information than he already knew, which was little enough. He soon realised that in order to get any reliable information, he would have to use an unimpeachable first-hand source, which is where Volusenus again steps into the limelight of history's stage. In Caesar's own words;

"In order to get this information before risking an expedition, he [Caesar) sent a warship in command of Volusenus, whom he considered a suitable man for the job. His orders were to make a general reconnaissance and return as soon as he could. Meanwhile Caesar marched the whole army into the country of the Morini, from which there was the shortest crossing to Britain..."

This passage raises a question; for if Caesar sent Gaius Volusenus on his fact-finding mission before he himself marched with his army into the country of the Morini, from where did Volusenus begin his journey? The passage implies that Volusenus started for Britain somewhere other than Portus Itius (Boulogne?) which was probably the major seaport of the Morini at this time and was where Caesar's fleet later sailed. Most modern scholars think that Caesar's bridge over the Rhine was somewhere near Confluentes (modern Koblenz), but this is dependant on an emendation to the surviving text of Caesar's de Bello Gallico, where it states that the preceeding battle in which the Germanic tribes the Usipetes and the Tenctheri were massacred took place near the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine. It is possible, on the basis of the textual difficulties described above, that the massacre was further downstream to the north, near the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine; this could put the bridge somewhere in the region of Noviomagus (Nijmegen). If Caesar's chronology is to be taken verbatim, then I would be more inclined to believe the latter interpretation, and place the scene of the massacre near Noviomagus, for if Volusenus set out in his warship from the region of Confluentes, a further 150 miles upstream, his journey from there to the North Sea would have taken a further two days, leaving him no time at all in which to reconnoitre the approaches to Britain.

Another point which supports the Noviomagus locale, is the fact that Caesar himself states in de Bello Gallico (IV.1) that the Germanic tribes; "crossed the Rhine in large numbers not far from its mouth", in other words from the north. It would not be too controversial therefore, to assume that once Caesar started to get the better of them in battle, the surviving warriors would attempt to escape by retracing their steps, for whatever means they had used to cross the Rhine, be it by boat, raft or bridge, would still be in place, and the disspirited Germans would seek to return by the same method. It may be as well at this point to quote from the works of Lucius Annaeus Florus;

"Further complaints against the Germans were brought by the Tencteri. On this occasion Caesar took the initiative and crossed the Moselle by a bridge of boats and made for the Rhine itself and the enemy in the Hercynian forests ; but the whole tribe had fled away to their woods and marshes, so great was their panic caused by the appearance of the Romans on the further bank of the river."

This passage shows that Florus may have had difficulties himself with the discrepancies in Caesar's account and tried to make the necessary geographical emendations in his own rendition of events during the Gallic War. He states that Caesar's first bridge was not across the Rhine, but merely the Moselle (Mosella), although he could have meant the Meuse (Mosa), which would have made more sense, for if Caesar crossed the Moselle it would have placed him far to the south of Germany near Switzerland. He also infers that the bridge was of the pontoon variety, again in direct contradiction of Caesar's account. This passage shows just how much doubt there is concerning the actual location of the bridge, and therefore, the starting point of Volusenus' journey.

To continue with the account of Caesar, he briefly narrates his preparations for the crossing to Britain, and mentions his audiences with several British envoys; he then concludes the same chapter describing Volusenus' return;

"... He sent Commius to visit as many tribes as possible, to urge them to entrust themselves to the protection of Rome, and to announce his impending arrival. Volusenus reconnoitred the coast as far as he could without disembarking and putting himself into the power of the natives, which he dared not do, and returned four days later with his report."

We are not given the details of his report, however, but it is plain from this passage that Volusenus did not spend very long touring round the coastline of Cantium, and one must wonder if this speedy surveillance later had some bearing on Caesar's difficulties with his chosen landing site on the beaches between Deal and Walmer Castle. The fault does not lie with Volusenus, however, for his instructions had been in essence to 'have a quick look and get back as soon as possible'. It also seems that he was acting in a timid manner in refusing to disembark and look more closely at the lie of the land away from the coast, but this was merely being expedient, for what use would be any information he gathered, if he was unable to make his report to Caesar? It should be noted that Caesar had also sent Commius the Atrebatean to Britain in an ambassadorial capacity, to represent his interests to the British tribes. This fact is mentioned here, because Commius the Atrebatean was at a later moment in history to have a profound effect on the life of Gaius Volusenus Quadratus.

There is a further passing reference to Volusenus in de Bello Gallico, when Caesar was anchored off the coast of Britain near the White Cliffs of Dover;

"... Caesar thought this a quite unsuitable place for landing, and therefore rode at anchor until three o'clock, in order to give the rest of the ships time to come up. Meanwhile he assembled the generals and military tribunes and, telling them what he had learned from Volusenus, explained his plans. ..."

It is my opinion that Gaius Volusenus Quadratus was not present among the tribunes at this meeting, and my reasoning behind this is hinted at in the excerpt quoted above. It is obvious from the passage that Caesar had not imparted the reconaissance information gathered by Volusenus to his officers until his fleet was stationed before the White Cliffs of Dover. The other ships to which Caesar refers in the excerpt were the eighteen transport vessels that had been unable to join his fleet at Portus Itius, and had been held up at Ambleteuse, eight miles to the north. Just before Caesar set off with his legions aboard the main fleet, he had sent his cavalry overland to Ambleteuse, with orders to board the transports there and to follow him as soon as possible. Taking all these factors into account, how was Caesar to have the recon. data passed to the officers in charge of his cavalry? It is my belief that Volusenus had been sent with the cavalry for that express purpose, which explains why Volusenus was not present at the briefing off Dover, and also lends credence to the argument in the previous discussion where it is assumed that Volusenus was a cavalry officer.

53BC - Relieves seige of Cicero's Camp

Following his second crossing of the Rhine in the summer of 53BC and his apparently ineffectual campaign against the Sugambri, Caesar withdrew to the western (Gallic) bank and employed a ruse to secure his eastern flank while he dealt with the Eburones in Gaul, the tribe of his arch-enemy Ambiorix. In order to dupe the Germans into thinking that he would soon return, Caesar dismantled the last two hundred feet of the eastern (Ubian) end of the bridge, keeping the greater part of its length intact, thus implying that he would use it again in the near future. He then built a strong fort at the Gallic end - which included a remarkable four storey watch-tower - and garrisoned it with a detachment of twelve cohorts under the command of a young tribune named Gaius Volcacius Tullus. The idea being to keep the Germans guessing about his next move, thus keeping them on the defensive and hopefully, on the eastern bank of the Rhine.

The principal tribe behind the revolt in Gaul during 54-53 BC were the Eburones who were governed by two chieftains, one of them being Ambiorix the instigator of the rebellion, the other was a venerable and seemingly respected nobleman named Catuvolcus. Caesar marched with his army through the Ardennes, sending his entire cavalry force under the command of Lucius Minucius Basilus ahead of his legions with orders to effect a swift strike into the homelands of Ambiorix. He was instructed to dispense with the usual campfires which could emit smoke trails during the day or tell-tale lights at night, so as not to give the enemy any forewarning. The cavalry attack succeeded almost beyond all expectations when the Romans burst upon the camp of Ambiorix himself, taking the Eburones completely by surprise, but the wily Gallic chieftain managed to evade capture by the narrowest of margins while members of his household valiantly kept Basilus' horsemen at bay.

Catuvolcus, who was then a frail old man, upon hearing of the attack on the home encampment of Ambiorix, and unable because of his infirmity either to offer resistance or suffer the hardship of a protracted flight through the difficult terrain of his homeland, decided to honourably commit suicide. As he did so - according to Caesar by poisoning himself with Yew - he repented being so easily led by the persuasions of his younger fellow magistrate to believe that their tribe could succeed against the strength of Caesar where others had failed. After the defeat of Ambiorix and the death of Catuvolcus, the dispirited Eburones melted into the surrounding countryside, some into the forest of the Ardennes, others into the tidal islands of the northern coastline of Belgica.

Caesar placed all of his heavy baggage at Atuatuca in the centre of the territory of the Eburones, making use of the fortifications of the old winter fortress of Sabinus and Cotta which was still servicable. He placed it under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero - the younger brother of Marcus Cicero the famous orator - giving him the fourteenth legion, newly-levied from Italy and a small company of two hundred cavalry. Caesar then split his forces; Titus Atius Labienus, the ablest and most trusted of Caesars legates was given three legions and ordered to march "towards the coast, into the region bordering on the Menapii, ..."; another three legions under the command of Gaius Trebonius were sent to "ravage the district lying on the frontiers of the Atuatuci. ..."; the three remaining legions - at this point in time Caesar's total legionary force numbered ten - were taken by Caesar himself and marched "to the river Scheldt, which flows into the Meuse, and to the western end of the Ardennes, ..." where his intelligence reported Ambiorix himself had gone accompanied only by a small number of cavalry.

Cicero was told that Caesar would return to the fortress at Atuatuca in seven days hence, and Labienus and Trebonius were also instructed to do likewise if it were tactically expedient. The three Roman forces then dispersed; Labienus headed north west, Trebonius marched towards the west-south-west, and Caesar advanced due south.

Having no large strongholds to speak of, nor any standing army, the Eburones had abandoned their farmsteads and dispursed in small family groups into the surrounding forests. This had the effect of rendering Caesars most effective offensive forces ineffective, for it robbed Caesars legions of any tangible strategic objectives. He would have to seek out each surviving pocket of Eburone resistance, whether it was an individual warrior hiding out in some woodland bolt-hole, or a small band of desperate men holed-up in a naturally defended rocky outcrop, or a peasant family fled into the relative safety of marshland nearby his home and accompanied by their livestock, or a noble and his retinue. Caesar was of the opinion that it was far too risky to risk exposing his legionary troops to the sort of campaign that the situation imposed for he believed that their training was unsuited to the task of supressing an enemy using such guerilla tactics, so he declared an open house amongst the allied Gaulish nations, inviting them to plunder the territories of the Eburones.

To protect his eastern flank during these operations Caesar relied on his ruse with the bridge to keep the Germans on their own side of the Rhine - this was to prove a costly gamble. News of the pillaging of the Eburones quicky spread, and was soon to reach the ears of the Sugambri, who wanted a share of the spoil quickly put together a force of two thousand horsemen, and by means of a number of commandeered boats and purpose-built rafts, crossed the river at a point some thirty miles downstream of the site of Caesar's bridge garisson. The Sugambri entered the territory of the Eburones from the east, and there were no Roman forces in this direction, for upon hearing from Eburone tribesmen captured whilst fleeing eastwards that the Romans baggage - and plenty of loot - was lying at Atuatuca virtually unprotected. Due to the distribution of Caesar's legions to north, west and south of Atuatuca, the Sugambri horsemen swept through the countryside towards Atuatuca totally unopposed.

On the morning of the seventh day following Caesar's departure from the camp, the day on which he stated he would return, Cicero had authorized five cohorts of his legionaries - half of his available force - to gather corn and fresh supplies from the fields in the immediate vicinity of the Roman fortifications, which had been left abandoned and untended by the Eburones in their flight. very day that the Germans came within striking distance of Atuatuca, and despite Caesars orders not to do so; ...

"As the Germans saw that the Roman troops had now manned the fortifications, they gave up hope of taking the camp by storm, and retired with the booty that they had hidden in the woods. Even after their departure, the defenders were still so frightened that Volusenus, who was sent ahead by Caesar with the cavalry and arrived that night in the camp, could not make them believe that Caesar was close at hand, with his army safe and sound. Fear had so completely possessed them all that they nearly took leave of their senses, and would have it that the whole army had been cut to pieces, and that the cavalry had managed to escape by flight: if the army were note destroyed, they maintained, the Germans would never have attacked the camp. The panic was eventually stopped by Caesar's arrival."

51BC - Attempts to assassinate Commius

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50BC - Wounded by Commius

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48BC - Targeted by Traitors

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